Kenyans have unwittingly been paying billions of shillings to cover up for theft of fuel at Kenya Pipeline Company in a scam that could have run for years.

The Nation is today revealing that the stolen fuel is accounted for as spillage and that, when insurers refuse to pay for it, the bill is passed on to the consumers via the Energy Regulatory Commission.

As a result, Kenyans have been financing a shadowy syndicate at KPC, until last month, when oil companies said “enough is enough” and refused to have the cost of 11 million missing litres footed by consumers.

SPILLAGE

KPC had told the oil marketing companies that more than 7.2 million litres were lost through spillage and another 4.4 million litres stolen at Koru, near Kisumu.

At best, this is a riveting fairy tale; at worst, an audacious lie

At KM391, an obscure pipeline post nine kilometres outside Konza along Mombasa Road, KPC claims there was an oil spill on March 2, 2017, and that the company lost 224,000 litres. The Nation went to KM391 and found no evidence of such a spill.

KPC has also told the oil companies that use the pipeline that this year at KM392 and KM395, inside Lisa Ranch in Makueni — owned by former Head of Civil Service and Secretary to the Cabinet Philip Mbithi — it lost 1.97 million litres in yet another spill.

But the Nation was told by the Lisa Ranch farm manager, Mr Moses Parsaoti, that there was no such spill this year, yet KPC has been pushing insurance companies to pay and the ERC to pass the bill to wananchi.

MULTI-BILLION SHILLING SCHEME

It is not clear how long this fuel theft racket has been going on, but what is certain is that it could turn out to be a daring multi-billion-shilling scheme.

As a result, a row has emerged between KPC and all the major oil companies over the whereabouts of 11.646 million litres of fuel, worth over Sh1 billion, which the company claims spilt in the fields or was stolen in the last two years.

Suspecting foul play, 10 leading oil marketers wrote a joint letter on October 26, 2018, and informed KPC that they want to bring in their own technical experts from abroad to check the accuracy of stock statements issued by the corporation and get to the bottom of what is turning out to be bogus records of loss.

TWO OPTIONS

There are only two options on the table: either the insurance companies pay for the loss, or the bill is passed to the consumer by the ERC.

KPC has no fuel of its own and holds stock in its system on behalf of oil marketers.

Sources within the State corporation told us that the industry has refused to absorb the loss and the insurers are reluctant to commit themselves. That has left the management of KPC in a quandary as oil marketers demand their oil … or the truth.

Although the KPC managing director Joe Sang was not committal on who will pick up the tab in case the insurance companies do not pay for the “loss”, we now have evidence that oil marketing companies refused to have the loss passed on to consumers via the ERC, which has often been used to sanitise the losses.

INSURERS

Mr Sang told us he was waiting for the insurers’ decision: “The insurers appointed their own loss adjustors,” he said.

“They went to the spillage site to ascertain whether the amount recorded as lost was correct. At the moment, we are in the final stages of negotiation.”

The falling-out between KPC and the oil marketing companies happened on August 23 at the Serena Hotel in Nairobi, where they refused to accept the Sh1 billion loss. Minute 4 of the meeting indicates that the oil marketing companies refused to pay and resolved that the losses should neither be passed on to them nor to consumers.

It all started on July 5, 2018, when Mr Sang wrote a letter to Supplycor Kenya Limited, the independent legal entity incorporated by the oil-marketing companies in Kenya to coordinate activities along the fuel supply chain, notifying them that in the last two years a total of 11.646 million litres of fuel got lost due to “vandalism and spillages on the main line from Mombasa to Nairobi”.

COVERED BY CIC

In his letter, Mr Sang said that “these spillages are covered by CIC Company Insurance under the Industrial All Risks policy”, and that “the company expects the above losses to be compensated by insurance to the fullest extent possible and any balances not remedied shall be recovered from the industry”. But the CiC Group chief executive Tom Gitoho differed with Mr Sang, saying the company can only pay for “loss that meets the terms of our policy.”

Mr Gitoho said that after every incident reported, they “normally engage experts” to verify.

Mr Sang, while acknowledging oil marketers have demanded a forensic audit, said the company is ready for the audit, which industry experts say will reveal the “darkest secrets of KPC”.

“I don’t think it is a forensic audit per se; all they want is to confirm their stocks within KPC,” Mr Sang said. “We have told them they are welcome and we have nothing to hide.”

FORENSIC AUDIT

The ERC director-general Robert Oimeke has also written to Mr Sang urging KPC to liaise with marketers “for a forensic audit of the product loss”.

It is the first time that oil marketers are demanding a forensic audit after years of complaints that insiders have been fiddling with the system to record false losses which are then passed to the insurers or the mwananchi.

“This will, for the first time, allow Kenyans to have an independent audit of the rot within the organisation. Everyone is scared of the latest move by oil marketers,” says a source privy to the new demand by oil firms.

The demand letter, also copied to Petroleum and Mining Cabinet Secretary John Munyes, is signed by managing directors Joe Muganda (Vivo Energy), Goke Aluko (Total Kenya), David Ohana (KenolKobil) and Macharia Irungu (Gapco Kenya).

Others are Mr Duncan Murashiki (OilLibya Kenya), Mr Paul Limo (Gulf Energy), Mr Anthony Munyasya (Galana Oil), Mr Abdirizak Ahmed (Hass Petroleum), Mr Christian Callede (Oryx Energies) and Mr Hassen Zalgaonker (Engen).

The 10 directors have told Mr Sang that they would like to carry out the forensic audit within next month.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

In their terms of reference, they say they want to validate the controls around physical stock movement, but the bottom line is that they want to know what happens to their product once it leaves the ship in Mombasa.

The second issue they want to verify is the procedure used to allocate fuel and the metering of the product.

“If I pump a million litres from Mombasa, I expect a million litres is Kisumu,” a CEO of one of the oil marketing companies told the Nation.

The other most critical issue is the handling of the gain-loss.

“KPC is notorious for only declaring loss and not gains,” says an engineer privy to the KPC network.

Insiders say the demand for a forensic audit has caught KPC management by surprise.

“This audit will not only expose the scam of the oil price formula, but also the scandal of the 0.25 per cent provision that caters for any losses,” said a source close to the management.

FIDDLING WITH SYSTEM

Multiple sources have revealed to us that insiders within KPC have been fiddling with the system to record false losses, which are legally covered by the 0.25 per cent provision, and that, every month, fuel worth Sh250 million is sold out to some petrol dealers without raising any alarm.

Industry sources told the Nation that the insurance company demanded to see the police investigation report and argued that it is not possible to lose fuel worth Sh1 billion without causing an environmental crisis.

“This is equivalent to 291 tankers of 40,000 litres. KPC cannot show where the spillage occurred,” said our source.

A document sent to the oil marketers says that between March and June 2017, KPC lost 4.49 million litres of fuel at Koru after siphoning equipment was connected to an underground pipeline and fuel piped to a nearby petrol station.

ILLEGAL CONNECTION

In a statement Mr Sang had sent to newsrooms, he said the leakage had been reported on June 16, 2017 after KPC officials discovered an illegal connection with a network of pipes leading to a petrol station labelled Hess Energy Kenya some 100 metres away.

“We have a case in court which is ongoing,” said Ms Gloria Khafafa, the KPC Secretary.

While KPC has said that 1.5 million litres flowed into Prof Mbithi’s dam in the Kapiti plains last year, we could not independently verify the amount. Some workers who oversaw the clean-up say that all the water was pumped out into three tankers of 40,000 litres each, meaning only 120,000 litres could have spilt here.

The Lisa Ranch farm manager told us: “Haikuwa mafuta mingi. (It wasn’t that much). They cleaned up the dam last year and it is now in use.”

In total, KPC claims to have lost 4.8 million litres between KM391 and KM397, which is inside Prof Mbithi’s Lisa Ranch, in the last two years.

“Why, then, haven’t you repaired this section?” we asked Mr Sang.

“We have given the proposal to the Board to replace the entire pipe in Mbithi’s farm,” he said.

NGONG FOREST

KPC had told the marketers that there was a major spill in Ngong Forest in April and May this year, and that 1.2 million litres of jet fuel, kerosene and petrol were lost. KPC wanted insurance to pay for this too.

But the Cabinet Secretary for Environment, Mr Keriako Tobiko, said: “I am hearing it for the first time. There is nobody who knows about it. I have even talked to Kenya Forest Service and they don’t seem to know of such a spill.”

Mr Tobiko said that had it happened, it would have “caused an environmental crisis” at the forest. “We would even have made arrests,” he said.

A note from Kenya Forest Service says that in May this year KPC claimed that the line inside the forest had been drilled.

REPAIRS

“We visited the site and found them carrying out repairs on the destroyed pipeline. We never saw any spillage. On Wednesday (last week) there was another allegation of destruction of the pipeline. The forester was not informed and they felled some trees within the pipeline way leave.”

With no evidence of spillage of 1.2 million litres in Ngong Forest, the KFS says that “the destruction and theft of fuel could be an inside job by company employees”.

The forensic audit request comes at a time that KPC is in focus following revelations that water was passed through the pipeline system and accounted for as fuel.

Our informant now says that the water came from Line 5 during the commissioning of the pipeline. It is not clear why the water was not drained as per the procedure, but instead it was allowed to flow up to Kisumu, where 14 trucks that had gone to pick up oil were loaded with water.

It has not been explained why water was allowed to be part of the 94-million-litre line fill for Line 5.

 

The counties of Kenya are geographical governance areas create by the 2010 Constitution of Kenya as the units of devolved government.

There are 47 counties whose size and boundaries are based on the pre 1992 Districts of Kenya The counties’ names are set out in the First Schedule of the Constitution of Kenya.

Establishment

County governments were established in 47 counties (largely), after the scheduled general elections in August 2013.

List of counties

Under the new constitution, Kenya is now divided into 47 counties for administrative purposes. They are grouped below according to the former region of which they were part, with their areas and populations as of the 2009 census:

Code	County	Region	Area (km2)	Population (2009 Census)	HQ
	Coast
1	Mombasa (County)	Coast	212.5	939,370	Mombasa (City)
2	Kwale	Coast	8,270.3	649,931	Kwale
3	Kilifi	Coast	12,245.9	1,109,735	Kilifi
4	Tana River	Coast	35,375.8	240,075	Hola
5	Lamu	Coast	6,497.7	101,539	Lamu
6	Taita–Taveta	Coast	17,083.9	284,657	Mwatate
1	Mombasa (County)	Coast	212.5	939,370	Mombasa (City)
1	Mombasa (County)	Coast	212.5	939,370	Mombasa (City)
7	Garissa	North Eastern	45,720.2	623,060	Garissa
8	Wajir	North Eastern	55,840.6	661,941	Wajir
9	Mandera	North Eastern	25,797.7	1,025,756	Mandera
	Eastern
10	Marsabit	Eastern	66,923.1	291,166	Marsabit
11	Isiolo	Eastern	25,336.1	143,294	Isiolo
12	Meru	Eastern	6,930.1	1,356,301	Meru
13	Tharaka-Nithi	Eastern	2,409.5	365,330	Kathwana
14	Embu	Eastern	2,555.9	516,212	Embu
15	Kitui	Eastern	24,385.1	1,012,709	Kitui
16	Machakos	Eastern	5,952.9	1,098,584	Machakos
17	Makueni	Eastern	8,008.9	884,527	Wote
	Central
18	Nyandarua	Central	3,107.7	596,268	Ol Kalou
19	Nyeri	Central	2,361.0	693,558	Nyeri
20	Kirinyaga	Central	1,205.4	528,054	Kerugoya / Kutus
21	Murang’a	Central	2,325.8	942,581	Murang’a
22	Kiambu	Central	2,449.2	1,623,282	Kiambu
	Rift Valley
23	Turkana	Rift Valley	71,597.8	855,399	Lodwar
24	West Pokot	Rift Valley	8,418.2	512,690	Kapenguria
25	Samburu	Rift Valley	20,182.5	223,947	Maralal
26	Trans-Nzoia	Rift Valley	2,469.9	818,757	Kitale
27	Uasin Gishu	Rift Valley	2,955.3	894,179	Eldoret
28	Elgeyo-Marakwet	Rift Valley	3,049.7	369,998	Iten
29	Nandi	Rift Valley	2,884.5	752,965	Kapsabet
30	Baringo	Rift Valley	11,075.3	555,561	Kabarnet
31	Laikipia	Rift Valley	8,696.1	399,227	Nanyuki
32	Nakuru	Rift Valley	7,509.5	1,603,325	Nakuru
33	Narok	Rift Valley	17,921.2	850,920	Narok
34	Kajiado	Rift Valley	21,292.7	687,312	Kajiado
35	Kericho	Rift Valley	2,454.5	752,396	Kericho
36	Bomet	Rift Valley	1,997.9	730,129	Bomet
	Western
37	Kakamega	Western	3,033.8	1,660,651	Kakamega
38	Vihiga	Western	531.3	554,622	Vihiga
39	Bungoma	Western	2,206.9	1,375,063	Bungoma
40	Busia	Western	1,628.4	743,946	Busia
	Nyanza
41	Siaya	Nyanza	2,496.1	842,304	Siaya
42	Kisumu	Nyanza	2,009.5	968,909	Kisumu(City)
43	Homa Bay	Nyanza	3,154.7	963,794	Homa Bay
44	Migori	Nyanza	2,586.4	917,170	Migori
45	Kisii	Nyanza	1,317.9	1,152,282	Kisii
46	Nyamira	Nyanza	912.5	598,252	Nyamira
47	Nairobi (County)	Nairobi (Province)	694.9	3,138,369	Nairobi (City

 

The independent ectoral and and Boundaries Commission went flat out award contracts to certain firms, against all legal and regulatory challenges, to the loss of the taxpayer. IEBC also bought some items at three times the market rate. Even then the paid for materials that were delivered Ieng a.fret the 2017 elecfion ~d ended. Besides Safran which enjoyed inexplicable privilege, IEBC – against myriad court cases and petitions to the procurement regulatory authority – went flat, out to ensure Al Ghurair Printing and PUblisbing LLC, a DUbitl,based compaJWwhith-the Opposition linked to the Jubilee candidate, printed and delivered ballot papers. “Engagement of Al Ghurair was wrought with litigation and the commission position was manifest all through in the defence of the company. In fact, IEBC didn’t provide room for alternative. It was fixated on this company;’ says an insider. A South African company in­ terested in the contract had its offer in dead water. Ren-Form CC, proposed to print and deliver presidential ballot papers in less than a fortnight, if contracted. “For delivery to (Jomo Ken­ yatta International Airport) by not later than August 2, 2017 provided production starts by July 21;’ Jean-Pierre du Sart, its sales director wt ote back to IEBC on July 14, 2017. Presidential papers The presidential papers for the General Election arrived on August 1, 2017. Implicitly, IEBC wasn’t time-strapped as it claimed to justify the contract award to Al Ghurair. The offer followed a plenary resolution that an alternative interJ;:).atio~ i:lom,pany ‘De identi­ fied. to procure the ballmS’ in line with a court judgment that almost disrupted IEBC ‘s plan to award Al · Ghurair. The Court annulled the contract on the basis that IEBC failed to conduct the statutory public participation. Instructively, Ren Form CC isn’t a run-of-the-mill company; it has supplied ballots in 22 African countries, including Zambia on three occasions before losing out to Al Ghurair in the August 2016 elections. Thus, it was plainly fallacious for the IEBC to claim that it was time-strapped and that alternative suppliers lacked the technical capability. As it turned out, IEBC reached out to Ren Form CC as a matter of procedure. Notably, Al Ghurair printed an extra 1.2 million (instead of the 196,115 agreed at the Plenary) presidential ballots in contro- ‘theft was versial circumstances, a matter that further complicated the al­ ready strained relations between Chebukati and Chiloba. On August 1, 2017 -just a week to election – Chebukati asked Chiloba to explain “who gave (him) authority to print excess of 1.2 million instead of 196,115 ballot papers (1 per cent of the total requisition). The 1 per cent was to cater for spoilt ballots and “adverse circumstances “as well as reduce the risk of mismanagement of ballot papers”. Inhis respease, Chiloba a~teed that plenary had resolred that, in­ deed, 1 per cent extra ballots were to be prin~ed but the,ml:li1ber yta$ to be “rounded off to the nearest 50”. How IEBC resolved this isn’t known, for the matter appeared to have ended with Chiloba’s response. However, according to the Auditor General, “verification undertaken in 35 sampled coun­ ties across the country there were falsification of records on issued ballot papers maintained at IEBC warehouse in Nairobi compared with actual receipts in the field re­ sulting in a variance of 2,534,904 ballot papers which have not been accounted for”. The Al Ghurair contract was signed just days after IEBC’s then head of procurement Lawy Aura was sent packing “With immediate effect” .for de.clining to give a favourable opinion on the proposed award to Ghurair, according to sources. At the end, the contract for printing of ballot papers went through open tender, restricted tender then direct procurement. Al Ghurair survived this bizarre process. Apart from the controver­ sy-strewn contracts for KIEMS and ballot papers, almost all other financial deals had a tint of fraud. The acquisition of data bundles can only pass for a spending binge. IEBC acquired Sh127.6 million worth of data bundles (149,640GB or 149TB) from Safaricom, Telkom and Airtel. Yet when the Auditor General analysed Internet use on the SIM cards, only 605.3GB of bundles worth Sh515,269 had been used – a mere 0-4 per cent of the actjlli.<tition. 1t’s :incemprebensible that IEBC didn’t enter into a postpaid ar­ rangement with the telcos. Either elements in the secretariat were out to make a fast kill or an extrav­ agant IEBC failed to pre-quantify the amount of data required before issuing the contract. Con­ sequently, Sh127.08 million went to waste or wasl’trlsapprdplliat.ed. But more confoi:mdirig is a case where IEBC cloned contracts – a situation that resulted in the loss of billions of shillings. The work was replicated, given different titles and then awarded separately yet the goods and ser­ vices involved could have been performed by a single supplier. Perhaps IEBC would argue that it sought to spread risks. But in real sense, the Commission did this to benefit multiple vendors, ‘theft was versial circumstances, a matter that further complicated the al­ ready strained relations between Chebukati and Chiloba. On August 1, 2017 -just a week to election – Chebukati asked Chiloba to explain “who gave (him) authority to print excess of 1.2 million instead of 196,115 ballot papers (1 per cent of the total requisition). The 1 per cent was to cater for spoilt ballots and “adverse circumstances “as well as reduce the risk of mismanagement of ballot papers”. Inhis respease, Chiloba a~teed that plenary had resolred that, in­ deed, 1 per cent extra ballots were to be prin~ed but the,ml:li1ber yta$ to be “rounded off to the nearest 50”. How IEBC resolved this isn’t known, for the matter appeared to have ended with Chiloba’s response. However, according to the Auditor General, “verification undertaken in 35 sampled coun­ ties across the country there were falsification of records on issued ballot papers maintained at IEBC warehouse in Nairobi compared with actual receipts in the field re­ sulting in a variance of 2,534,904 ballot papers which have not been accounted for”. The Al Ghurair contract was signed just days after IEBC’s then head of procurement Lawy Aura was sent packing “With immediate effect” .for de.clining to give a favourable opinion on the proposed award to Ghurair, according to sources. At the end, the contract for printing of ballot papers went through open tender, restricted tender then direct procurement. Al Ghurair survived this bizarre process. Apart from the controver­ sy-strewn contracts for KIEMS and ballot papers, almost all other financial deals had a tint of fraud. The acquisition of data bundles can only pass for a spending binge. IEBC acquired Sh127.6 million worth of data bundles (149,640GB or 149TB) from Safaricom, Telkom and Airtel. Yet when the Auditor General analysed Internet use on the SIM cards, only 605.3GB of bundles worth Sh515,269 had been used – a mere 0-4 per cent of the actjlli.<tition. 1t’s :incemprebensible that IEBC didn’t enter into a postpaid ar­ rangement with the telcos. Either elements in the secretariat were out to make a fast kill or an extrav­ agant IEBC failed to pre-quantify the amount of data required before issuing the contract. Con­ sequently, Sh127.08 million went to waste or wasl’trlsapprdplliat.ed. But more confoi:mdirig is a case where IEBC cloned contracts – a situation that resulted in the loss of billions of shillings. The work was replicated, given different titles and then awarded separately yet the goods and ser­ vices involved could have been performed by a single supplier. Perhaps IEBC would argue that it sought to spread risks. But in real sense, the Commission did this to benefit multiple vendors, of Oracle database and security solution, which also comprised the review and assessment of the election technology, was awarded to Oracle Technology Systems (Kenya) Ltd via direct procure­ ment. It was controversial. First, Oracle itself reportedly drew the terms of reference (ToRs). Second, there was no contract between the Commission and this vendor. Instead, there were signed ordering documents. Third, the KPMG audit of the voter register had already identi­ fied the inherent security lapses in the IEBC technology and had suggested solutions. Inflated cost Fourth, the Commission’s ICT department had requisitioned pur­ chase of Oracle database solutions and licences at Sh8o million but it was awarded for Sh273 million. Yet, despite the inflated cost, Oracle partially delivered – it conducted one training instead of six. Database Vault, Real Ap­ plication Cluster (that enables sharing of resources in form of cloud architecture) and training were “not complete”, according to audits. IEBC contracted Africa Neuro­ tech Systems Ltd to supply. Install, implement, and commis ion and support its primary and secondary data centre equipment. It was paid Sh249.3 million against contract budget of Sh130 million. But ac­ cording to the Auditor General, the Commission “paid the vendor before testing and commissioning the equipment”. The data centre wasn’t ready at the time of August Election. Neurotech Systems Ltd is owned by Dan Kinyua Njuguna. A multimillion-shilling company with a presence in five African countries, it is intriguingly clas­ sified by the Public Procurement Oversight Authority (PPOA) among “disadvantaged” SME companies – those earmarked for Affirmative Action. Despite non-compliance, IEBC still engaged Neurotech – through direct procurement – to supply and deliver storage expansion for the converged infrastructure, at a cost of Sh165.7 million. Sh165.7 million was paid against a user requisition of Sh124 million. The equipment was delivered on January 9, 2018 – well after the FPE. In the end, IEBC paid Neu- rotech Sh415 million for facilities never used during the two elections. As regards Telkom, it wasn’t among those pre-qualified for the tender (co-location services for data centre and disaster recovery site). However, in unclear terms, IEBC’s evaluation committee recommended it be awarded the contract, which was inexplicably overvalued by Sh4.92 million. Once it became apparent that these companies had defaulted on their contracts, IEBC and Safran went into panic mode. The French company wrote to the Commission to be allowed to use Japan’s Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corpo­ ration (NTT) cloud services. The Commissioner would later accept the offer, even without a contract between the two, in a letter dated July 28, 2017. Notably, the country went into the election without a backup server. IEBC didn’t have any data recov­ ery infrastructure. And this partly explains why it couldn’t respond to Nasa’s demand to access the server. Nonetheless, IT experts question why IEBC dealt with NTT through Safran Identity yet the Japanese company has local representation – Dimension Data (which oper­ ates in Kenya as Dimension Data Kenya, Internet Solutions Kenya and Plessey Kenya). “The Commission needs to jus­ tify contracting process for cloud services while at the same time in­ curs Sh1,002,813,667.97 on similar services that were never utilised;’ says the Auditor Generai. Our investigations reveal that IEBC awarded co:p,t:rac:t for aloud services despite an advisory by the Communication Authority of Kenya against the use of private servers. The Authority, in response to the commission’s proposal to use a private cloud server to supplement its primary and secondary disaster recovery sites, warned that sensitive data couldn’t be placed in private hands. Intriguingly, the cost for cloud services during FPE was Sh50.7 Million more than during the Gen­ eral Elections. On June 20, 2017, the then IT chief Chris Msando presented a paper on the transmissiQn_of results for the August elections in which he indicated that some polling stations were out of the 3G and 4G network coverage required for KEMS transmission of results. An analysis found 11,115 stations report­ edly outside the network coverage. To cover this, IEBC proposed 1,000 and 1500 satellite units (at cost of Sh550 million and Sh825 million respectively) to be used in results from outside the requisite network. The first batch of Airtel’s 1,000 Thuraya data modems and SIM cards were distributed to constituencies before the Aug 8 elections. However, in the end, only 339 modems and SIM cards with 4GB were used. The rest, according to IEBC internal audit, were deliv­ ~ed OOAUgt!St 24, 2Ql{, way after the polls – altllopgh the Auditor General says that they were in fact supplied much later, on October 5, 2017. Yet, despite this, IEBC still went ahead to give out another contract for 1,000 units for FPE and which were received in January 2018. I The Commission appeared not interested in the devices it had procured for the August polls or the unused 600. At the end, owing to delay in delivery, IEBC “reactivated and reused” the devices, according to Auditor General. Same supplier That apart, a ballot box that cost Sh1,800 during the August election was later procured at Sh2,500 for the FPE. This was in spite of the similarity in specifications and same supplier. Thus IEBC lost Sh27.9 million (from purchase of 42,927 boxes) in inflated costing. Mini Mix Agencies was on March 3, 2017 awarded the Sh19.5 million contract to supply and deliver 3,696,000 security seals at unit price of Sh5.30. However, it delivered just 2,001,600 units on July 22, 2017. The rest, 1,694,400 seals, were sup­ plied on October 19, 2017 – more than 2 months after the election. Yet IEBC didn’t terminate the contract even after the supplier had stalled. Instead, the commission rushed to contract Ramaas Supplies Ltd, through direct procurement, for 500,000 seals at Sh24.5 million (at Sh49 a unit) to mitigate the shortfall. Instructively, this company had failed at the preliminary evaluation stage during the tender process, having quoted Sh18.10 a unit. High Court Judge Pauline Nyam­ weya last October ruled that the Sh350 million contract to provide “strategic communication and in­ tegrated media campaign services” was irregular. The Secretariat had deviated from plenary resolution and inex­ plicably hired ScanAd. All said, “election 2017 was a swindle;’ according to a member of the now-defunct Interim Independ­ ent Electoral Commission. “The theft was beyond the imaginable:’

 

Kenya has a rich and complex history. Unfortunately, much of it risks being lost due to inadequate documentation, fragmented storytelling, and the passage of time. Even more concerning is the recurring tendency to revise history to suit prevailing political, social, or ideological dispensations. In the process, important truths are often diluted, overlooked, or reshaped to fit contemporary narratives.

On this wing of the How and Where blog, you will find a space for explanation, reflection, and contextualisation. This is where we go beyond headlines and surface-level accounts. Here, we seek to help you understand not just what is happening, but why it is happening.

We explore Kenya’s past deliberately and thoughtfully. This wiki revisits historical episodes, unpacking key moments, and examining the decisions, conflicts, and forces that have shaped the nation. From pre-colonial societies to the colonial period, from independence to modern-day governance, we connect the dots between then and now.

At the same time, we pay close attention to current affairs. Today’s events are tomorrow’s history, and documenting them with clarity and honesty is essential. We record and analyse ongoing developments not just as news, but as part of a larger story that future generations will look back on for understanding.

This section is, therefore, both a mirror and a lens: a mirror reflecting where Kenya has been, and a lens through which we can consider where it might be going. By grounding ourselves in historical context and engaging critically with the present, we aim to foster a deeper, more informed perspective on the country’s journey.

Ultimately, this is a space for curious minds—those who want to understand Kenya beyond the obvious, to question narratives, and to appreciate the layered realities that define the nation today.

Maziwa ya nyayo